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1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	NEW YORK HELICOPTER CHARTER,
4	Plaintiff,
5	v. 07 CV 4069 (MGC)
6	AIR PEGASUS, et ano.,
7	Defendants.
8	
9	New York, N.Y. March 6, 2008
10	11:00 a.m.
11	Before:
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13	HON. MIRIAM GOLDMAN CEDARBAUM
14	District Judge
15	APPEARANCES
16	HANTMAN & ASSOCIATES Attorneys for Plaintiff
17	BY: ROBERT HANTMAN DIANA GARCIA
18	I GOV DD TEDMAN
19	LEON FRIEDMAN Attorney for Defendant Air Pegasus
20	NONE OF THE PAIN A CALL ACTION
21	KONNER TEITELBAUM & GALLAGHER Attorneys for Defendant Hudson River Park Trust
22	BY: MICHAEL A. GOULD
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issue.

1 THE COURT: This is the case of New York Helicopter 2 Charter v. Air Pegasus. 3 MR. HANTMAN: Yes, your Honor. 4 Good morning. 5 Robert Hantman and Diana Garcia, for the plaintiffs in this case. 6 7 With the Court's permission, Ms. Garcia is going to 8 address the issues raised by Air Pegasus, and I was going to 9 address the issues raised by HRPT. 10 THE COURT: First, you can choose which of you will 11 respond, but I will ask you some questions. 12 I will come back to you. 13 What are the damages that New York Helicopter is 14 claiming? 15 MR. HANTMAN: At this point, your Honor, it is about 16 \$40,000 per month --17 THE COURT: I should put it another way. What precise 18 injury are you claiming was caused by the defendants? 19 MR. HANTMAN: Number 1, all of our client's 20 sightseeing activity from midtown have been curtailed entirely. 21 THE COURT: And that is caused by the defendants? 22 MR. HANTMAN: It is caused by defendants, we believe, 23 irrationally and inexcusably --24 THE COURT: Irrationality is not a constitutional

What is the deprivation of due process that you are asserting?

MR. HANTMAN: Under 1983, we believe he is being discriminated against. It may be a class — but he is being discriminated against because, unlike other helicopter operators and even the competitors of his who have a good relation with Air Pegasus, we believe he is selectively being prevented from landing there or taking off from there.

THE COURT: Is discrimination a violation of due process of law?

MR. HANTMAN: We believe it is, your Honor.

MS. GARCIA: There are two main points. One is the right to move freely.

THE COURT: What do you mean the right to move freely?

There is no obligation on the part of any heliport to give

everybody an opportunity to fly through that heliport. Isn't

that right? What do you mean by move freely?

MS. GARCIA: There are two types of work done at the heliport. One is sightseeing and the other one is charter work.

THE COURT: Is it your position that the Constitution requires that every helicopter owner in New York be able to do both of those things through this heliport?

MS. GARCIA: No, your Honor. Our main complaint is that his ability to pursue a lawful business has been

diminished.

THE COURT: I understand that. But is that a violation of the Constitution?

MS. GARCIA: Yes. We cited a couple of cases including --

THE COURT: Why don't you tell me the facts of your best case.

MS. GARCIA: In this specific case about due process is the fact of the right to pursue his --

THE COURT: I don't want to know about rights. I want to know about facts.

MS. GARCIA: In Watson v. Kansas --

THE COURT: Who decided that case?

MS. GARCIA: In that case a police officer -- it is similar in the way that a person is being interfered with its business and that is why --

THE COURT: What is it that the police officers did?

MS. GARCIA: These police officers were searching the premises of the business, interfering with the business. In this case, we have the sightseeing and the chartering --

THE COURT: Wait just a moment. That case didn't go off on the fact that the search was an interference with the business of the plaintiff. It went on an entirely different question, whether the search was legal, isn't that right?

MS. GARCIA: Yes. It was a warrantless search.

THE COURT: So it has nothing to do with what is asserted here.

MS. GARCIA: But even in the cases that we cited about the abortion clinic, for instance --

THE COURT: How does that have anything to do with what is being complained of here?

MS. GARCIA: What is being complained of here is that he is not being allowed to conduct his business.

THE COURT: That's why I started with the question, is every helicopter owner in New York City entitled to conduct its business through this heliport? Does this heliport have an obligation to everybody in the city?

MS. GARCIA: I understand that for chartering work, for sightseeing work, you need a permit for that, you should be allowed to land there and everybody should be allowed if you have the authorization --

THE COURT: I am not asking you what should be, but does the Constitution guarantee it, that you can land there, that nobody can stop you from landing there?

MS. GARCIA: I would say yes, but more under equal protection more than under due process because for the specific facts of this case the Constitution would guarantee --

THE COURT: Do you have any case that suggests that anybody who wants to fly a helicopter is entitled to fly it through this defendant?

MS. GARCIA: No, your Honor. We don't have a case like that but we do have cases showing that people should be afforded equal treatment from the government, especially when it is a public heliport.

THE COURT: What is equal treatment? Does that mean that everybody should be able to do this is what I am asking you?

MS. GARCIA: Equal treatment means that all of the people in the same situation at the heliport like he was operating before, that he be treated equally.

THE COURT: Are you saying that if you once use a heliport, that heliport is obligated for the rest of your natural life to let you use it?

MS. GARCIA: No. I am not saying that. I am saying that there are some parameters that should be complied with. There are regulations.

THE COURT: What is the reason that the heliport gave for not continuing a relationship with this man?

MS. GARCIA: They claim that Mr. Roth had violated a policy there, but the point and what we are trying --

THE COURT: Suppose that is the reason.

MS. GARCIA: Let me tell you what the policy was because they say that he was advertising for his company on the premises and that nobody else was allowed to do that. And in the complaint, it was that someone was allowed to do that same

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advertising. And even though Mr. Roth says that he was not promoting advertising at that point, but he claims he did not do that. And the point here is to show that he was treated differently because he had a previous litigation with APH and that he was singled out and not allowed to conduct his business.

THE COURT: Is that your due process claim, that he was singled out because he brought a case?

MS. GARCIA: That is our equal protection claim.

THE COURT: All right. That is your equal protection claim that because he brought a lawsuit against the heliport, they refused him the use of the heliport. And your position is that that is a violation of equal protection of the law?

MS. GARCIA: Yes. It is part of it.

THE COURT: Is there any other constitutional claim that you are making here?

MS. GARCIA: I believe -- we have the due process and the equal protection but --

THE COURT: But you are really relying on equal protection. You cannot really phrase a due process claim.

MS. GARCIA: Equal protection.

THE COURT: That's your claim. I want to be clear as to what it is exactly that you are claiming. And what the claim is, is that your client brought a suit against the heliport, and after that suit was brought, they refused to

allow him to use the heliport. They never refused before that, but they refused afterwards.

MS. GARCIA: There has been history with our client -THE COURT: But then you are getting into something
else. I am trying to focus on what it is you are claiming.

If your claim is that after he brought a lawsuit, they cut him off because he was pursuing that lawsuit, that may be an equal protection claim, but now you are saying that you are claiming something that happened before that.

MS. GARCIA: No. It is true he got the lawsuit and that is one aspect. But the other aspect, what is alleged in the complaint, that they were trying to take away his business to favor some of the people associated with APH that they were favoring.

THE COURT: What is the information on which that belief is based?

MS. GARCIA: There is the audit report and the controllers. It shows that, for instance, State Aviation was given a special parking spot in which they only pay 500 a month.

THE COURT: So this is a complaint that the state agency -- if it is a state agency -- brought against the heliport through auditing, is that right?

MS. GARCIA: Yes. This was an audit that they did.

THE COURT: So, clearly, the state agency was not

approving of this; you are suing state officials, you said.

MS. GARCIA: Yes.

THE COURT: The state officials conducted an audit, to the extent that they have supervisory powers --

MS. GARCIA: There were two audits. The first one -THE COURT: That is not important.

The important point is this. What is the wrong committed by someone acting under color of state law? To the extent that you are claiming that this trust is a state agency, what is it that that trust did that was discriminatory?

MS. GARCIA: First thing I want to clarify, there were two audits. The first one was conducted by HRPT, the second by the controller. In the first one by HRPT, after they make this finding, they put in writing that they have not found any wrongdoing by APH and they settled with APH on favorable terms, and that is in the complaint.

THE COURT: So you are suing because they settled with APH on favorable terms; you are not suing for a wrong to you, you are suing for a general wrong, is that right?

MS. GARCIA: No. Because they knew everything that was happening at the heliport and they condoned --

THE COURT: And they failed to act?

MS. GARCIA: Exactly.

THE COURT: Now, is a failure to act which we normally think of as negligence, a constitutional tort?

1	MS. GARCIA: In this
2	THE COURT: Because we are talking about
3	constitutional rights.
4	MS. GARCIA: I understand. But I think for state
5	action purposes, you have to show how the joint activity, how
6	they both interact in what is being
7	THE COURT: Intentional conduct is what you have to
8	show in order to allege that someone acting under color of
9	state law violated the Constitution. These are torts we are
10	talking about.
11	MS. GARCIA: Yes.
12	THE COURT: These are intentional torts?
1.3	MS. GARCIA: Yes.
14	THE COURT: You are not really alleging that the trust
15	intended the misconduct of the heliport?
16	MS. GARCIA: We allege that the heliport intended to
17	condone the conduct, that they intended to favor them by doing
18	all these things and by allowing them to raise their rate in
19	order to pay for the rate increase that they did
20	THE COURT: The rate increase is an entirely different
21	matter, isn't it? That has nothing to do with discrimination.
22	MS. GARCIA: It has somehow
23	THE COURT: How?
24	MS. GARCIA: It shows the entwinement in a way because
25	HRPT

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1 THE COURT: What was the trust's interest? 2 MS. GARCIA: Being repaid. 3 THE COURT: The trust gets a cut of the revenue of the 4 heliport, that's true. Why is it in their interests to have discrimination, to have people pay different amounts? 5 MS. GARCIA: It is in their interest because that way 6 7 they can pay for the settlement they just signed. 8 THE COURT: Excuse me? 9 MS. GARCIA: They can pay for the settlement. 10 THE COURT: You can get just as big revenue if you 11 discriminate if you get a lot of return from somebody, isn't 12 that right? 13 MS. GARCIA: But that's true, but if you see that they raise the rates went up 6 --14 15 THE COURT: Just a moment. The audit didn't show that there was anything wrong with the amount of the rates. You are 16

THE COURT: Just a moment. The audit didn't show that there was anything wrong with the amount of the rates. You are talking about discriminatory rates, the fact that some people paid more than other people. That is a different matter.

MS. GARCIA: The audit, for instance, for a landing, they found that some people were charged more and some people were charged less.

THE COURT: I understand. That didn't result in lower return. It just resulted in some people paying less than other people, isn't that right?

MS. GARCIA: Yes.

THE COURT: It was not in the interests of the trust to complain. From what you say, their interest was in getting more money.

MS. GARCIA: The trust would have gotten -- I agree with that.

THE COURT: What was their interest? We are talking about intentional conduct of the trust.

MR. HANTMAN: If I may, your Honor, there was an audit performed by HRPT. At some point it was determined that money had been diverted from HRPT even by Air Pegasus over a period of time --

THE COURT: But you are not suing for that. You are not concerned about whether Air Pegasus stole money from the state. You are concerned about what they did to your client.

MR. HANTMAN: But if I could just answer your question about what was intentional. What happened then because of the relationship --

THE COURT: But it is intentional with respect to your client, not with respect to whether the heliport was stealing money.

MR. HANTMAN: But what happened as a result, it does affect our client. It affects a lot of the clients, but it is part of a factual entwinement here actually because you have to show some entwinement or joint participation.

THE COURT: Excuse me? You have to show -- I didn't